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 In the past twenty years, crimes of sexual abuse and sexual assault have been widely 
reported and discussed in both the American media and society.  Instances such as the sexual 
abuse scandal in the Catholic Church and the rise in inappropriate relationships between teachers 
and their students have changed the way American’s view individuals charged with sexual 
offenses and the ways in which society interacts with sexual predators.  As a result of these 
changes, society began to view individuals who have committed sexual offenses as predators 
deserving special attention and monitoring from society.  This has resulted in the creation of sex 
offender registries that enable citizens to easily identify neighbors who have been convicted of 
sexual offenses as well as parents being reminded to more closely monitor who their children are 
left alone with or speak to on the internet.  With so much attention being turned to the 
monitoring of individuals convicted of sexual abuse and preventing sexual abuse, the courts of 
the United States reexamined the manner in which defendants charged with sexual crimes are 
tried.  The federal courts have opened the door to the greater admissibility of prior incidences of 
sexual misconduct in reaction to the greater attention paid to sexual offenders.  In contrast, 
Michigan has refused to handle the admission of prior bad acts of sexual misconduct in a manner 
different from the admission of prior bad acts in any other case.  By resisting the urge to single 
out sexual crimes, Michigan has preserved the rights of criminal defendants while recognizing 
that prior acts of sexual misconduct can and should be admitted but only under certain 
circumstances where it can be assured that the defendant may still receive a fair trial. 
 In order to ensure that every defendant is afforded a fair trial, the prior bad acts of a 
defendant have been inadmissible to show that the defendant has the character to commit similar 
bad acts.1  This type of propensity evidence has traditionally been kept out of the courtroom so 
that it can be ensured that the jury is only basing its decision on the facts of the crime for which 
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the defendant is charged.  This protection has been enshrined in Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 
404(b).  FRE 404(b) states, “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”2  In essence, this rule 
prevents the admission of evidence that the defendant has committed acts or crimes similar to the 
crime for which the defendant has been charged at the current trial.  The fear is that the jury will 
look past the evidence presented in the current trial and base any finding of guilt on evidence that 
the defendant has committed a similar bad act or crime in the past and therefore most likely 
committed that crime again.   
The traditional approach to propensity evidence 
 FRE 404(b) however allows evidence of prior bad acts to be admitted if those acts are 
admitted for a narrow purpose.3  Specifically, evidence of prior bad acts may be admitted to 
show, “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.”4  In order for evidence to be admissible under one of these exceptions, the 
proponent of the evidence must first provide opposing counsel with notice that evidence of a 
prior bad act will be offered.5  This notice requirement reflects the value of evidence regarding a 
prior bad act.  The drafters of 404(b) sought to ensure that a defendant would have ample 
opportunity to object to any evidence regarding a prior bad act.  These narrow exceptions to the 
general prohibition against the admission of prior bad acts work in tandem with FRE 401 and 
FRE 403.  Namely, the admission of prior bad acts for a permissible 404(b) purpose must first be 
relevant to a material issue at trial.6  Second, the admission of the prior bad act must be more 
probative than prejudicial.7  The interaction between these three federal rules ensured that any 
evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts received a careful vetting by the court prior to the 
admission of any evidence.  First, the evidence must be offered for a permissible purpose.8  
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Second, the evidence must be relevant to a material issue at trial.9  Finally, the admission of the 
evidence must be more probative than prejudicial.10 
The introduction of FRE 413, 414 and 415 
 However, this interaction between FRE 401, 403, and 404(b) changed on July 9, 1995.  
On that day, FRE 413, 414 and 415 became effective and radically changed the manner in which 
prior bad acts are admitted in federal court with regards specifically to sexual crimes.11  First, 
FRE 413 governs the admission of prior bad acts or similar crimes with regards to sexual assault 
cases.12  FRE 414 governs the admission of prior bad acts in child molestation cases.13  Finally, 
FRE 415 governs the admission of prior bad acts of sexual assault or child molestation in civil 
cases.14  These three rules changed the admission of prior bad acts significantly with regards to 
only one type of prior bad act, those involving sexual misconduct.  This was the first time that 
any specific criminal act had been singled out for special evidentiary treatment by the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 
 The most significant change can be seen in the plain language of the newly enacted rules.  
Commentators have taken note of the danger that the language used in FRE 413-415 posed to the 
other rules of evidence.15  The plain language of the rules serves as the most accurate indicator 
when determining the types of evidence that Congress sought to make admissible.  First, FRE 
413 states, “evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual 
assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is 
relevant.”16  This language is also echoed by FRE 414 and 415.17  This language is a dramatic 
change from the language used in FRE 404(b).  Specifically, FRE 404(b) states, “It (evidence of 
prior bad acts) may, however, be admissible for other purposes.”18  This language indicates the 
importance of ensuring that any evidence of prior bad acts is considered for relevancy and the 
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prejudicial impact on the defendant.  However FRE 413 states that any evidence of a prior sexual 
bad act “is admissible” as long as the evidence is relevant.19  This language seemingly strips 
away the presumption that propensity evidence will not be admissible unless there is a clear non-
propensity purpose for the evidence.20  Based on the plain language of the FRE 413, 414 and 
415, defendants charged with sexual assault or abuse in a criminal federal proceeding seem to 
have a harder challenge to face in order to keep evidence of prior bad acts out of evidence 
because there seems to be a presumption in the plain language that the evidence “is 
admissible.”21 
 In order to understand the changes made to the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is instructive 
to consider how the new rules were passed.22  Congress alone has the power to create and enact 
new rules regarding the admittance of evidence in federal court and the general running of the 
federal court system.23  Congress affirmed this right when FRE 413, 414 and 415 were passed as 
part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.24  In addition to the new 
federal rules of evidence, the Act also included measures such as a ban on assault weapons and 
grants for local and state law enforcement agencies.25  The new rules were not the main focus of 
the legislation even though they radically changed the admission of prior bad acts in the federal 
courts. 
 The Judicial Conference of the United States strongly responded to the amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence when the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994 were passed.26  The report of the Judicial Conference stated, “After careful study, the 
Judicial Conference urges Congress to reconsider its decision on the policy questions underlying 
the new rules.”27  The conference first stated its belief that amendments were not necessary 
because the admission of prior bad acts was already contemplated and allowed in certain 
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circumstances by FRE 404(b).28  The report also addressed the substance of the amendments that 
had been proposed: 
“Furthermore, the new rules, which are not supported by empirical evidence, could 
diminish significantly the protections that have safeguarded persons accused in criminal 
cases and parties in civil cases against undue prejudice.  These protections form a 
fundamental part of American jurisprudence and have evolved under long-standing rules 
and case law. A significant concern identified by the committee was the danger of 
convicting a criminal defendant for past, as opposed to charged, behavior or for being a 
bad person.”29 
 
The report also pointed out the difficulty in offering evidence of prior bad acts from a procedural 
perspective.30  “In addition, the advisory committee concluded that, because prior bad acts would 
be admissible even though not the subject of a conviction, mini-trials within trials concerning 
those acts would result when a defendant seeks to rebut such evidence.”31   
The report itself of the Judicial Conference was very unique.  “It is important to note the 
highly unusual unanimity of the members of the Standing and Advisory Committees, composed 
of over 40 judges, practicing lawyers, and academicians, in taking the view that Rules 413-415 
are undesirable. Indeed, the only supporters of the Rules were representatives of the Department 
of Justice.”32  This aspect of the report, namely the near unanimity of dissent except for the 
representative of the Department of Justice, reflects the political nature of the amendments.  The 
only supporter of the amendments was acting on behalf of the administration that had sought the 
amendment and signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.  The other 
members of the conference were able to respond and evaluate the amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence without having to take into consideration politics or any other consideration 
that would have influenced the Department of Justice.  Even though the amendments were 
opposed on both procedural and substantive grounds by the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, the amendments were enacted as passed. 
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The practical application of FRE 413, 414 and 415 
 The federal courts have not interpreted the amendments to the federal rules entirely 
consistent with the plain language of the amendments.  Although FRE 413 states that evidence of 
prior sexual bad acts “is admissible”, the courts have not held that this language completely 
overrides the other evidentiary protections created by the Federal Rules of Evidence.33  The Sixth 
Circuit, which controls the federal courts in the state of Michigan, recently laid out the 
procedures by which evidence of prior sexual bad acts should be admitted at trial.  In United 
States v. Seymour, the defendant was charged with sexually abusing his niece.34  The federal 
prosecutor sought to introduce evidence that the defendant had sexually assaulted three other 
women previously.35  At trial, the evidence was admitted, and the judge refused to provide the 
jury with any sort of limiting instruction regarding the evidence of prior bad acts.36  In analyzing 
the admission of the evidence, the court first discussed the relationship between FRE 413 and 
414.  The court held that FRE 413, under which the evidence was admitted at trial, is broad 
enough to cover both instances of sexual misconduct against adults as well as children.37  
Furthermore, both rules indicate that neither rule should be used to limit the admission of 
evidence under any other rule.38  The court then discussed the relationship between FRE 413 and 
403.  The court held that the trial court appropriately applied the 403 balancing test to the 
admissibility of the evidence.39  “Rule 413 was enacted as an exception to the default position set 
forth in Rule 404(b) that propensity evidence is presumptively more prejudicial than 
probative.”40  The court held that this is the only other hurdle that evidence of past sexual 
misconduct must overcome in order to be admitted in federal court.41  Yet, outside of examining 
whether the evidence was unduly prejudicial, the court did not look to determine if the evidence 
met any of the non-propensity purposes listed in FRE 404(b).  The court also did not even 
 7
discuss whether the court erred when it failed to provide any limiting instruction to the jury 
regarding the proper non-propensity use of the evidence once it was admitted. 
The state of Michigan uses rules of evidence that echo the Federal Rules of Evidence in 
order to create consistency and uniformity between the Michigan Rules of Evidence (MRE) and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.42  However, the state of Michigan has not adopted Federal Rules 
of Evidence 413, 414 and 415.  The Michigan Supreme Court has consistently objected to the 
addition of any amendments to the Michigan Rules of Evidence if those rules apply only to one 
specific type of crime.  Recently in October of 2004, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected an 
amendment to include prior bad acts of domestic abuse to the exceptions listed in MRE 404(b).43  
Justice Taylor in concurrence took notice of the danger that can take place when the desire to 
prosecute a particular crime is the motivation for amending evidentiary rules.  “As is customary 
at a time of such zeal, reformers want the courts to gut traditional evidentiary protections so as to 
facilitate prosecutions.  While I am as horrified by the specter of domestic abuse as any, I do not 
feel it, or any other imaginable domestic peril, justifies the wholesale dumping of our traditional 
defendant protection rules.”(emphasis added)44  Justice Young went further in concurrence to 
directly address the crime specific amendments that had previously been passed by Congress.  
“While the Congress has recently adopted crime specific exceptions to the general prohibition 
against propensity evidence, see FRE 413 and FRE 414, I am unconvinced that the principles 
under girding MRE 404 ought to be undercut by specific classes of criminality.”45  Justice Young 
pointed out the utility of MRE 404 in refusing to add crime specific evidentiary exceptions.  
“Consequently, until we conclude that a defendant’s guilt should be decided as much on past 
conduct as on current charged conduct, I believe that MRE 404 serves a vital purpose protecting 
the interests of all concerned in the pursuit of justice.”46  As the Michigan Supreme Court has 
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pointed out, crime specific exceptions to the traditional rules of evidence create the danger of 
eroding a defendant’s right to a fair trial by allowing propensity evidence to inappropriately taint 
the evidentiary pool.  The Supreme Court of Michigan has correctly refused to add any crime 
specific exception, particularly an exception for sexual assault or molestation, to the Michigan 
Rules of Evidence.  Michigan courts should continue to resist amendments to the Michigan 
Rules of Evidence and judge the admissibility of all propensity evidence under the rubric of 
MRE 404(b). 
Admission of prior bad acts in Michigan 
 Following the passage of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, MRE 404(b) was enforced by 
the courts by looking at a four prong test set forth in People v. Golochowicz.47  This test 
required: 
“First, there must be substantial proof that the defendant committed the other act sought 
to be introduced.  Second, there must be some ‘special quality or circumstance’ of the 
other act which tends to prove some issue or fact other than the defendant’s bad 
character.  Third, the other acts evidence must be material to the case, in the sense that 
the issue or fact proved by the proffered evidence must be in issue, or probative of some 
matter in issue.  Finally, the probative value of the evidence sought to be introduced must 
not be outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.”48 
 
In People v. Engelman, the Michigan Supreme Court applied this test.49  The defendant was 
charged with third degree sexual conduct for taking sexually explicit photographs of the victim.50  
The prosecutor argued that evidence of prior misconduct involving explicit photographs should 
be admitted to show a common modus operandi of the defendant.51  The court held that the 
photographs alone did not establish a common plan or modus operandi because the photographs 
of past misconduct did not by themselves establish that the defendant had a common plan by 
which to carry out sexual misconduct.52  In addition to holding that the prior bad acts had no 
proper purpose under MRE 404(b), the court also stressed the danger posed by the admission of 
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prior bad acts.  “We conclude, however, by acknowledging that the proper and improper 
purposes of other acts evidence are so variable, the state of proofs regarding materiality so 
infinite, and the precedents and commentators so inconsistent, that a rule of minimalism is the 
best rule of thumb in this area.”53  The court took note of the particular dangers associated with 
evidence of prior bad acts.  The recognition of the dangers associated with evidence of prior bad 
acts has been instrumental in helping craft a careful jurisprudence in Michigan when considering 
the admittance of prior bad acts. 
The four-part Vandervliet test 
 The modern framework for considering the admission of prior bad acts in Michigan was 
set forth by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Vandervliet.54  In that case, the defendant 
was employed as a case manager assigned to assisting developmentally disabled young men.55  
The defendant was charged with second-degree criminal sexual conduct with regards to three 
separate victims.56  The prosecutor sought to admit testimony in each proceeding regarding the 
defendant’s conduct with the other two victims pursuant to MRE 404(b).57  The trial court 
refused to allow the testimony, and the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the Michigan Court 
of Appeals.58  In addressing the issue, the Michigan Supreme Court looked to the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United States.59  The US Supreme Court in 
Huddleston considered the admission of prior bad acts under the rubric of FRE 404(b) prior to 
the amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence that added FRE 413, 414 and 415.60  In 
Huddleston, the court pointed out the purpose behind 404(b).  The rule “generally prohibits the 
introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts that might adversely reflect on the actor’s character, 
unless that evidence bears upon a relevant issue in the case such as motive, opportunity, or 
knowledge.”61 
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The Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the admission of evidence pursuant to MRE 
404(b) in a manner that would be consistent to FRE 404(b) prior to the passage of FRE 413-
415.62  Although the admittance of prior bad acts involving sexual misconduct are no longer 
governed by FRE 404(b), the state of Michigan evaluates prior bad acts of sexual misconduct in 
a manner consistent with FRE 404(b).  The Michigan Supreme Court set forth a four part test to 
determine whether prior bad acts could be admitted pursuant to 404(b).  First, “the prosecutor 
must offer the other acts evidence under something other than a character to conduct theory.”63  
“Second, as previously noted, the evidence must be relevant under Rule 402, as enforced through 
Rule 104(b), to an issue or fact of consequence at trial.”64  “Third, the trial judge should employ 
the balancing process under Rule 403.”65  “Finally, the trial court, upon request, may provide a 
limiting instruction under Rule 105.”66  This four part test recognized the importance and weight 
of testimony regarding prior bad acts.  The Michigan Supreme Court realized that MRE 404(b), 
alone, was not intended to govern the admission of prior bad acts.  Rather, the plain language of 
404(b) was just a first step to determining whether prior bad acts should be offered. 
 In the case of the defendant in Vandervliet, the court first considered whether the 
evidence of prior bad acts could be offered for a non-propensity purpose.67  The court held that 
evidence of other instances of molestation could be offered to show that the defendant’s conduct 
did not have an innocent intent.68  The evidence was also found to be relevant to the issue of 
intent because the defendant had entered a plea of not guilty which acted as a general denial to 
all charges.69  Therefore, the prosecution had to prove every element of the crimes charged 
including the intent of the defendant to commit the crime.70  The Supreme Court then remanded 
the case to the trial court to determine whether the testimony was admissible under Rule 403.71  
The court stated that “Rule 403 determinations are best left to a contemporaneous assessment of 
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the presentation, credibility, and effect of testimony, we remand this case to the trial court for 
further proceedings.”72  The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the MRE 403 
determination when determining the admission of prior bad acts by remanding the case for the 
trial court to determine whether or not the evidence was unduly prejudicial.  This test, for 
determining the admissibility of prior bad acts pursuant to MRE 404(b), was set forth by the 
Michigan Supreme Court a year before FRE 413, 414, and 415 were added to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.  Following the introduction of FRE 413, 414, and 415, the Michigan Supreme 
Court would have an opportunity to reconsider the process for determining the admissibility of 
prior bad acts. 
The importance of MRE 403 to MRE 404(b) 
 In People v. Crawford, the defendant was charged and convicted of possession with 
intent to deliver 50 to 225 grams of cocaine.73  At trial, evidence regarding the defendant’s prior 
conviction for a drug crime was admitted over the defendant’s objection.74  The judge, however, 
agreed to and did in fact provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the defendant’s prior 
conviction.75  When considering whether the evidence was admitted properly, the Supreme Court 
first looked back to its decision in Vandervliet.76  “In that case (Vandervliet), we rejected a rigid, 
bright-line approach to other acts evidence and directed the bench and bar to employ the 
evidentiary safeguards already present in the Rules of Evidence, as identified by the United 
States Supreme Court in Huddleston.”77  The court held in this case that the prosecutor had not 
shown that the evidence of the prior conviction could be admitted under any appropriate 
exception to MRE 404(b).78  The court based this ruling on the lack of factual similarity between 
the prior conviction and the case at trial.79  Previously, the defendant had been convicted when 
he had sold cocaine to an undercover police officer.80  In this case, the defendant was discovered 
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to be in possession of cocaine following a routine traffic stop.81  This lack of a factual connection 
between the charged crime and prior bad act is essential to determining whether the prior bad act 
is relevant to the current trial.   
Although the prior conviction at issue failed to meet the first element of the test set forth 
in Vandervliet, the court went on to discuss the importance of MRE 403 when determining the 
admissibility of prior bad acts.  The court pointed out that even if there was a proper purpose for 
the evidence under MRE 404(b), the evidence should not be admitted because it failed under 
MRE 403.82  “Rule 403 does not prohibit prejudicial evidence; only evidence that is unfairly so.  
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence 
will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.  In the context of prior bad acts, that 
danger is prevalent.”83  The Supreme Court rightly recognized the importance of keeping away 
from the jury evidence that is unduly prejudicial no matter how probative the evidence is.  
Although Crawford did not involve prior bad acts that would have fallen under FRE 413, 414, or 
415, the importance placed by the Michigan Supreme Court in applying MRE 403 highlights the 
superior approach Michigan takes to evaluating the admissibility of prior bad acts.  As discussed 
previously, FRE 413 states that evidence or prior bad acts that are relevant are admissible.84  The 
only other barrier to the admission of the evidence is whether the evidence is unduly prejudicial 
against the defendant.  This requirement however is not included in FRE 413.  This requirement 
comes from the language of FRE 403 as discussed previously.  It is possible that a court could 
one day hold that the plain language of FRE 413 controls and FRE 403 is not implicated by the 
admission of evidence pursuant to FRE 413.  In contrast MRE 404(b), which governs the 
admission of prior sexual bad acts in Michigan, only states that evidence “may” be admissible if 
offered for a permissible purpose.85  This language, as interpreted by the Michigan Supreme 
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Court, requires the evidence not only to be relevant but also to be not unduly prejudicial to the 
defendant.86 
Refinement of Vandervliet by Sabin 
The Michigan Supreme Court has clarified and refined the test set forth in Vandervliet 
through subsequent case law.  In People v. Sabin, the Michigan Supreme Court clarified both the 
differences between the Michigan approach to the admittance of prior bad acts involving sexual 
misconduct and the federal approach as well as the importance of determining the relevancy of 
the prior bad act.87  The defendant in Sabin had been charged with first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct.88  During the trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce testimony from the 
defendant’s stepdaughter that the defendant had previously sexually abused her for a period of 
eight years.89  The stepdaughter also testified regarding another incident where she alleged the 
defendant molested his daughter’s from a previous marriage.90  The trial court allowed the 
testimony to be entered into evidence under the theory that the testimony showed the defendant 
had a scheme or plan to sexually molest young women who are members of his household.91  On 
appeal, the defendant challenged the testimony on the basis that it was not offered for an 
appropriate purpose pursuant to MRE 404(b) and even if the purpose of the evidence was proper, 
the evidence was unduly prejudicial pursuant to MRE 403.92 
First, the Michigan Supreme Court instructed courts to continue using the test set forth in 
Vandervliet to evaluate evidence offered pursuant to MRE 404(b).93  The court then discussed 
the relevancy of the testimony offered and how the rules in Michigan differed from those of 
other jurisdictions.94  The court took note of the “lustful disposition” exception that many states 
had added to the listed exceptions found in FRE 404(b) in order to allow greater admissibility of 
evidence involving prior bad acts of sexual misconduct.95  The court then pointed out that 
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Michigan does not have any rule of evidence that is analogous to FRE 414 which deals 
specifically with sexual misconduct cases involving children.96  The Michigan Supreme Court 
also noted, in passing, reluctance to adopt rules in Michigan similar to FRE 413, 414, and 415.97  
“Only after a thorough debate over the underlying policy questions, using our notice and public 
comment procedure, would we consider adopting evidentiary rules that would allow the use of 
other acts for propensity purposes in sexual assault and child molestation cases.”98 (emphasis 
added) 
The court then went on to clarify the exact circumstances under which prior bad acts are 
relevant pursuant to MRE 404(b).  “Today, we clarify that evidence of similar misconduct is 
logically relevant to show that the charged act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the 
charged offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are manifestations of a 
common plan, scheme, or system.”99  This clarification requires trial courts to undergo an 
intensive factual comparison between the crime charged and the prior bad act.  The court went 
on to point out that similarity between the acts, by itself, is not sufficient to establish relevancy.  
“To establish the existence of a common design or plan, the common features must indicate the 
existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed 
need not be distinctive or unusual.”100  This requirement draws a clear line between relevant 
evidence and propensity evidence by separating out similar spontaneous acts.  Evidence of 
similar spontaneous acts is nothing more than evidence that the defendant has a propensity for a 
certain type of conduct.  This clarification offers a defendant far more protection than FRE 414 
by requiring the trial court to undergo an intensive factual investigation as the Supreme Court 
conducted in Sabin when determining the relevancy of the stepdaughter’s testimony. 
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The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when the 
stepdaughter was allowed to testify about past instances molestation.101  The court based this 
holding on factual similarities between the charged conduct and the past conduct that reached 
beyond mere similarity and established a common plan or scheme.102  The court pointed to the 
fact that: the defendant acted as a father to the victims, the victims were of a similar age at the 
time of the misconduct, and the defendant threatened the victims by telling them that their family 
would be broken up if they told anyone about the misconduct.103  “One could infer from these 
common features that defendant had a system that involved taking advantage of the parent-child 
relationship, particularly his control over his daughters, to perpetrate abuse.”104  By 
demonstrating to trial courts the type of intensive factual inquiry that should be undertaken, the 
Supreme Court of Michigan set a heightened threshold for determining the relevancy of prior 
acts of sexual misconduct.   
This heightened threshold is far more consistent with traditional notions of fairness in the 
criminal justice system than the threshold set forth in the plain language of FRE 414 which only 
requires similarity to the charged conduct without any showing of a common plan or scheme.105  
The test applied by the federal courts fails to provide a defendant with important safeguards 
regarding the admissibility of prior sexual misconduct.  As shown in United States v. Seymour, 
the federal courts do not undertake an intensive factual investigation regarding the exact 
circumstances involved in the prior misconduct and their similarity to the crime or crimes that 
have been charged.  Also, Michigan requires a limiting instruction when one is requested.  Yet, 
in federal court, the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction even when an instruction has 
been requested.  The lack of these two protections makes it far more likely that evidence of prior 
sexual misconduct will be used for a propensity purpose in federal court because the evidence 
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may show nothing more than the fact that the defendant has previously been guilty of sexual 
misconduct.  
Current application of MRE 404(b) 
This heightened requirement of relevancy to show plan or scheme has subsequently been 
applied by the Michigan Supreme Court both to allow and exclude evidence from trial.  In 
People v. Hine, the defendant was charged with child abuse and felony murder for beating a two 
and a half year old girl to death.106  Evidence was offered at trial by the defendant’s previous 
girlfriends that the defendant had previously beaten them by placing his fingers in their mouth 
and forcefully pulled their lips.107  At trial, the forensic pathologist testified that the victim 
suffered injuries similar to the injuries described by the defendant’s girlfriends.108  The Supreme 
Court held that the evidence of these similar injuries met the heightened threshold set by Sabin 
because the evidence allowed for the inference that the defendant used a common scheme or plan 
when assaulting the victim and his prior girlfriends.109 
In People v. Knox, the Michigan Supreme Court was confronted once again with a case 
of child abuse that led to death.110  The defendant was charged with felony murder and child 
abuse for shaking the victim causing severe injuries and death.111  At trial, testimony was offered 
that the defendant had previously been angry and while angry damaged walls and doors, and 
pushed his girlfriend.112  The Supreme Court held that this evidence did not meet the heightened 
threshold set forth in Sabin.113  “Under these circumstances, the evidence of defendant’s past 
anger could only serve the improper purpose of demonstrating that he had the bad character or 
propensity to harm his son.”114  The court found that none of the prior acts of violence had any 
similarity to the acts of violence that had caused the victim’s death.115  Also, no evidence was 
offered to show that the defendant was ever angry at the victim or re-directed anger to another 
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individual when he was angry with his girlfriend.116  The only purpose for the evidence would be 
to show that the defendant has a propensity for anger and violence. 
When looking at both Hine and Knox, it is clear that the heightened requirement of 
relevancy when evaluating the admissibility of prior bad acts pursuant to MRE 404(b) is not an 
insurmountable barrier to the admission of the evidence.  Rather, the requirements of Sabin adopt 
an intermediate approach.  “Hine neither announced new law nor did it signify a retreat from the 
Vandervliet principles; rather, it simply rejected an interpretation of Sabin that would have 
required an impermissibly high level of similarity between the proffered other acts evidence and 
the charged acts.”117  The formulation by the Michigan Supreme Court strikes the correct balance 
between allowing evidence that is similar and probative and evidence that only shows a 
propensity.  These safeguards have been abandoned in the Federal Rules of Evidence with 
regards to prior sexual misconduct. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals has used the guidance of the Supreme Court and the test 
set forth in Vandervliet to evaluate prior bad acts of sexual misconduct.  In People v. Knapp, the 
defendant was charged with molesting a fourteen year old boy during a mystical therapy 
session.118  At trial, the prosecutor sought to admit evidence showing that the defendant had 
molested another student in 1976.119  The prosecutor argued that this evidence was relevant for 
two purposes; first, to show a common scheme or plan of the defendant, second, to show that the 
contact between the defendant and the victim was sexual in nature which the defendant 
denied.120  The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the evidence was admissible for both 
purposes in this case.121  The evidence was relevant to the defendant’s plan because in both cases 
the victim and the defendant had a teacher-student relationship, the defendant sought to isolate 
the victims from their parents prior to the assault, and the manner of the assaults were similar 
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between the two cases.122  The evidence was also relevant to negate the defense of the defendant.  
The defendant claimed that the contact between himself and the victim was non-sexual and only 
for the purpose of spiritual training.123  The existence of the prior conduct made the defendant’s 
defense less likely and less credible.  When considering whether the evidence violated MRE 403, 
the court held that even though the prior conduct occurred 25 years prior to the trial in which it 
was sought to be admitted, the evidence was not unduly prejudicial.124  This case demonstrates 
why the amendment to the federal rules should not be adopted in Michigan.  The courts in 
Michigan are still able to admit evidence of prior sexual misconduct even when the misconduct 
is decades old.  The requirement that the evidence pass through several layers of review simply 
ensures that the evidence is not offered for a propensity purpose. 
In People v. Vernon, the Michigan Court of Appeals was faced with an incident to prior 
misconduct that was not similar to the conduct charged.  The defendant was charged with 
molesting the eight year old daughter of a neighbor while the families were together celebrating 
Thanksgiving.125  The prosecution sought to introduce evidence showing that the defendant was 
charged with third degree criminal sexual conduct of a fifteen year old girl.126  The prosecution 
wanted to establish the intent of the defendant when he inappropriately touched both girls.127  On 
appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the evidence was not admissible.128  First, the 
circumstances of the two incidents were quite dissimilar.  At the time of the prior incident, the 
victim was much older, the defendant and the victim had been drinking, and the defendant and 
the victim were alone in a building at the time of the assault.129  “It is a stretch to conclude that 
the 1989 incident sheds light on defendant’s state of mind during the charged incident through an 
inference based on the doctrine of chances, rather than an inference based on character.”130  The 
court also concluded that even if the evidence was relevant, it would be unduly prejudicial.131  
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The issue of whether the conduct was a mistake was only a minor issue at trial because the 
defendant denied the entire incident without admitting to any touching between himself and the 
victim.132  This case demonstrates the importance of the limits placed on the admission of prior 
acts evidence in Michigan.  The prior incident in Vernon was similar to the charged incident only 
in that it was related to sexual conduct.  Other than that, the incidences were dissimilar in almost 
every way including the age of the victim.  The admission of this evidence, as the Michigan 
Court of Appeals pointed out, could only conceivably be used as propensity evidence.   
In People v. Fields, the Michigan Court of Appeals was faced with a prior incident that 
was relevant to a specific issue at the trial that was central to the trial.133  At trial, a young man 
who lived with the defendant and the victim testified to previous misconduct between himself 
and the defendant.134  This testimony was particularly relevant because at closing defendant’s 
counsel stated that it would have been impossible for the defendant to commit the crimes alleged 
because the defendant suffered from erectile dysfunction.135  The testimony then of any prior 
sexual misconduct was very probative to counter the defense of the defendant.  The testimony of 
prior misconduct was also relevant because the prior incidents and the incident for which the 
defendant was charged occurred under similar circumstances.136   
This case demonstrates the importance of the requirement that the evidence must be 
relevant to an issue at trial in order to overcome MRE 403.  If the evidence is highly prejudicial 
to the defendant but only relevant to a minor issue, then the evidence will most likely fail the 403 
balancing test as occurred in Vernon.  Yet, when the evidence is highly probative to a central 
issue, as was the case in Fields, even incredibly prejudicial evidence will be admitted because it 
is so probative to determining a central issue at trial such as when the defendant makes a claim of 
impossibility.  This level of nuance is essential to the admission of prior acts of sexual 
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misconduct in Michigan.  The courts have operated a sliding scale to determine the admissibility 
of evidence under MRE 404(b).  This level of nuance is not present in the plain language of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  Michigan allows evidence of prior bad acts to be admitted in select 
circumstances when they are required to decide a central issue.   
In People v. Dobek, the defendant was charged with molesting his twelve year old step 
daughter of a period of years.137  At trial, the prosecution offered evidence of prior conduct by 
the defendant regarding a babysitter and his sister-in-law.138  Both women were not minors as his 
stepdaughter was at the time of the molestation.139  However, the court held that the evidence 
was relevant to establishing a scheme by the defendant to take advantage of any opportunity he 
had to sexually touch a woman.140  The prior acts of misconduct in this case are not as similar to 
some of the previous cases.  However, the prior conduct in this case was relevant to showing that 
the defendant had a plan to assault women under almost any circumstance.  The conduct for 
which the defendant had been charged occurred in the family home while other people were 
present in the home.141  Therefore, prior conduct was relevant to show that the defendant had 
acted inappropriately at other times when other individuals were present.  In this case, the court 
found the evidence to be relevant in a case that seems to be much closer than the previous cases.   
In People v. Causey, the defendant had been charged with first degree criminal sexual 
conduct with an individual under the age of thirteen.142  The prosecution offered evidence that 
the defendant had previously molested other young men who he had previously babysat.143  The 
circumstances of the prior bad acts as well as the circumstances for which the defendant was 
charged were very similar.  In both cases, the defendant had assaulted the victims while the 
defendant and the victims were playing hide and seek.144  The court held that the evidence was 
relevant on the basis that the circumstances of the incidents were almost identical and as such 
 21
demonstrated a plan or scheme of the defendant.145  Also, the defendant took advantage of his 
relationship with the victims as they all looked up to him as an older brother.146  Under these 
circumstances, it is clear that the evidence was offered for a non-propensity purpose which was 
to show the defendant’s common plan or scheme. 
The particular danger of propensity evidence in sexual assault cases 
While it is important to ensure that propensity evidence is not offered in any criminal 
case due to the improper inferences that may be drawn by the jury, there is a particular 
importance to keep propensity evidence away from the jury because of the high likelihood that 
the jury will use evidence of prior bad acts for an impermissible purpose regardless of any jury 
instruction.  Society today has placed sexual crimes into a special category that is far different 
from any other criminal offense.  Sexual crimes are seen more as symptoms of a disease as 
opposed to one time events.  This thinking is clearly reflected in the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
FRE 413 allows the introduction of any prior bad act of sexual misconduct when the defendant is 
charged with sexual misconduct.147  Congress clearly took the view, as evidenced by the 
amendment to the federal rules, that once a sex offender always a sex offender.  If that is the 
case, then any evidence of any prior sexual misconduct is relevant because if the defendant did it 
once, then he probably did it again.  This kind of inference is exactly the kind of inference that 
the federal courts tried to prevent through FRE 404(b).  Michigan continues to try and prevent 
this inference through MRE 404(b).  However, the view that sex offenders will act in accordance 
with a propensity to commit sexual crimes in expressed in other ways as well. 
The American Jury 
In 1966, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel published the results of their study of juries in the 
United States in The American Jury.148  Kalven and Zeisel sought to understand and create a 
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theory with regards to why juries act the way that they do.  One interesting observation studied 
was what the authors termed the “cross-over phenomenon”.  This occurred whenever the judge 
and the jury would have come to opposite results based on the same evidence.149  This can occur 
in two different ways.  First, the judge can choose to convict while the jury may choose to acquit.  
“In studying the disagreements in which the jury is more lenient than the judge, we have come to 
understand what we have called the jury’s sense of equity, or its modest war with the law.  It is 
understandable that the jury should at times acquit a defendant in defiance of the law.”150  
However, there were times that judge would choose to acquit yet the jury would choose to 
convict.  These occasions were more difficult to explain.  “But it is not so apparent what the 
reverse of this means, the situation in which the jury finds guilty a man whom the judge and the 
letter of the law would acquit.”151  These observations caused Kalven and Zeisel to view the jury, 
as an institution, differently.  “[W]e shall come to think of the jury not so much as an institution 
with a built-in protection for the defendant, but rather as an institution which is stubbornly non-
rule minded.”152 
To study this effect, when the jury convicts and a judge would acquit, the authors gave a 
jury four cases involving sex crimes where the defendant was technically innocent of the crime 
charged.153  “But, in each of the cases the jury is so outraged by the defendant’s conduct that it 
overrides distinctions of the law and finds him guilty as charged.”154  In one of the cases in 
particular, the defendant was charged with the statutory rape of his thirteen year old daughter.155  
The judge chose to acquit on the charge of statutory rape because there was a question as to 
whether the crime was technically committed because there was dispute as to whether the alleged 
act was ever completed.156  The judge decided that reasonable doubt existed and would have 
convicted the defendant of a lesser crime.157  However, the jury convicted the defendant of the 
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crime of statutory rape.  The judge then pointed out the reason for the jury’s verdict.  “The crime 
is so reprehensible that it may have had something to do with the verdict.”158  This study 
identified a very real phenomenon in courtrooms throughout the country.  The conviction of an 
individual who is technically innocent but found to be guilty because of conduct that does not 
technically meet the elements of the crime for which the defendant was charged.   
This study sheds light on the inherent problems associated with the federal approach to 
the admission of prior sexual misconduct.  Juries have shown that they are often unable to focus 
on delivering a truly fair verdict when faced with a defendant who has committed acts that are 
considered truly heinous by the jury.  Such occasions often occur in cases of sexual misconduct.  
Evidence of prior sexual misconduct, which is admitted for any purpose other than those listed in 
FRE 404(b) and admitted without a cautionary instruction, places before the jury evidence of a 
defendant’s acts that can prejudice a jury against the defendant.  It is understandable for a jury to 
be repulsed at the facts of criminal sexual conduct.  Yet, to place a defendant’s prior conduct 
before a jury when it is irrelevant to the charged crime repulses a jury for no reason.  For this 
reason, the Michigan Rules of Evidence at the very least ensures that the evidence is offered for a 
purpose relevant to the determination of whether or not the defendant committed the charged 
crime.  Also, the requirement that a limiting instruction be given if requested at least attempts to 
mitigate any improper reaction that a jury may have to the evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual 
misconduct. 
The message sent by singling out sex offenders for special treatment 
In 1994, Michigan passed the Sex Offenders Registration Act.159  This act required 
individuals who had been convicted of a sex offense to register their name and address with local 
law enforcement.160  Originally, the act only allowed law enforcement to access the information 
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that was provided by the convicted sex offenders.  The act was later amended to include a 
general notification provision that allowed private citizens to access a host of information.161  
This amendment was required by a bill signed by President Clinton which added a mandatory 
notification provision to the existing federal registration requirements for sex offenders.162  
Originally, Congress had enacted in 1994 the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and 
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act which required states to create sex offender registries 
in order to receive federal crime prevention funds.163  Individuals living in the same zip code as 
the convicted sex offender were able to obtain the registered sex offender’s name, address, the 
offense involved and a physical description of the individual.164  The provisions of Michigan’s 
sex offender registry were challenged in Lanni v. Engler.165 
In Lanni, the plaintiff challenged the sex offender registry on a variety of basis including 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, deprivation of due process, and deprivation of the 
constitutional right to privacy in addition to other claims.166  The court held that the intent of the 
registration act is simply regulatory even though the act itself has no statement of legislative 
intent.167  The court found that the act “does nothing more than create a method for easier public 
access to compiled information that is otherwise available to the public through tedious research 
in criminal court files.”168  “[T]he Michigan Act also seeks to provide the local citizenry with 
information concerning persons residing near them who have been convicted of sexually 
predatory conduct and who, by virtue of relatively high recidivism rates among such offenders 
and the devastating impact that sex crimes have on society, pose a serious threat to society.”169  
This case clearly sets out the purposes behind the Michigan sex offender registry.  The court held 
that since the information compiled by the registry is publicly available and the registry simply 
compiles the information and makes the information easily searchable.170  The sex offender 
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registry provides a valuable service to private citizens.  Yet, the fact that information regarding 
sex offenders is available outside of court actually argues against the admissibility of prior sex 
offenses at trial.  The existence of a sex offender registry sends the message to the public and 
potential jurors that information regarding prior sexual offenses is highly probative and that sex 
offenders have a high rate of recidivism.  While this information is useful outside of the 
courtroom, it is simply too dangerous inside the courtroom because the jury has been pre-
conditioned by society to misuse the information.  Information regarding prior convictions is 
always available outside of the courtroom to the public at large, yet has traditionally been kept 
away from jurors inside the courtroom because of the risks of improper use. 
The Michigan Supreme Court shed light on Michigan’s own interpretation of the 
Michigan sex offender registry in People v. Childers.171  In that case, the defendant plead guilty 
to sexual offenses in a court martial for assaulting his daughter in Michigan.172  The defendant 
was subsequently tried in Michigan state court for the same acts.173  The court held that the 
conviction in Michigan state court did not violate double jeopardy because the Michigan 
prosecution subjected the defendant to a unique set of penalties.174  Specifically, “the Michigan 
prosecution subjects defendant to registration as a sex offender and mandatory HIV testing.”175  
The court held that the state of Michigan had a “social interest” in requiring individuals 
convicted of sexual offenses to become members of the sex offender registry.176  While it is clear 
that the state and its citizens have an interest in keeping track of sex offenders outside of court, in 
court the interest of the defendant is paramount and should lead to the inadmissibility of prior 
convictions that can only be used for propensity purposes. 
Individuals convicted of sexual offenses have also been singled out by society and the 
courts once they have been convicted and incarcerated.  In Kansas v. Hendricks, the United 
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States Supreme Court upheld the indefinite commitment of an inmate following the completion 
of his sentence.177  The inmate had served a ten year sentence for sexually molesting two thirteen 
year old boys.178  The state moved to have Hendricks committed as a sexual predator shortly 
before his release from prison.179  A trial was held in which a jury heard of Hendricks’ history of 
sexual molestation of children and found that he was a sexual predator beyond a reasonable 
doubt.180  The court held that the commitment of sexual offenders found to be sexual predators 
following their sentence does not act as punishment.181  “Those persons committed under the Act 
are, by definition, suffering from a ‘mental abnormality’ or a ‘personality disorder’ that prevents 
them from exercising adequate control over their behavior.”182  The Kansas Act and the Supreme 
Court singled out sexual offenders as potential predators that are unable to resist the urge to 
commit further crimes.  As of March 2007, Mr. Hendricks has been committed in a treatment 
program for thirteen years past the end of his sentence.183  As of March, 2007, over 2,700 sexual 
offenders have been committed indefinitely pass the end date of their sentence through civil 
commitment laws.184  Programs that allow for sexual offenders to be held indefinitely following 
the completion of their sentence exist in nineteen states.185  Laws such as the one in Kansas and 
other states once more send the message to society and potential jurors that sexual offenders are 
incapable of changing their behavior.  Now, that is not to say an individual that has been 
adjudicated to be mentally abnormal or suffering from a personality disorder should not be 
committed.  Rather, evidence that an individual has been committed or convicted for sexual 
misconduct should only be allowed into a courtroom under the most limited and regulated 
circumstances.  The federal rules simply set too low of a standard for the admission of prior 
sexual misconduct without requiring so much as a limiting instruction to be read to the jury.  
Michigan, however, requires a thorough vetting of the evidence in order to ensure that the 
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evidence is used for a permissible purpose other than to show that the defendant has a propensity 
for committing similar acts. 
The federal courts as required by the Federal Rules of Evidence now approach prior bad 
acts of sexual misconduct in a manner that is all but unrecognizable from their approach prior to 
1994.  However, states such as Michigan have preserved the traditional approach to propensity 
evidence that does not single out sexual misconduct for special treatment.  When comparing the 
two approaches, it is clear that Michigan should continue to resist amending the Michigan Rules 
of Evidence to include provisions similar to FRE 413-415.  Society has rightly focused its 
attention on the prevention of sexual assault and molestation over the past twenty years.  
However, this focus on sexual crimes and the sometimes predatory nature of the offenders has 
created a great danger in the courtroom.  The danger is that any evidence of prior misconduct or 
conviction will lead the jury to convict the defendant for a past act and not for the crime charged.  
The passage of FRE 413-415 in 1994 has exasperated this danger by setting a lower bar in the 
federal courts regarding the admissibility of prior sexual misconduct.  In contrast, the approach 
that Michigan has continued to employ serves the interest equally of defendants, victims, and 
society as a whole.  The Supreme Court of Michigan should continue to resist any attempts to 
add rules similar to FRE 413-415 to the Michigan Rules of Evidence or interpret MRE 404(b) in 
a manner to allow the greater admissibility of prior sexual misconduct. 
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